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I
INTRODUCTION

Constitutional law can be many things, but most of all it can be an agent of
change. Ultimately, it determines the way we organize our lives, socially and
politically. It provides us with insights to help us understand and define our
society and where it is heading. It is intimately concerned with giving
meaning to ourselves and our relations with others.' But on their own,
constitutional guarantees are abstract concepts. They require judges,
through their interpretations, to breathe life into them. The act of giving
meaning to a constitutional guarantee, such as freedom of expression,
requires an examination of its context, purposes, history, precedent, and the
intent of the framers. 2 But guarantees are always open to competing
interpretations because usually the sources themselves require interpretation.
A reliance on one interpretation involves the suppression of another. It is at
this juncture where we find either explicit or implicit reliance on the ways in
which the interpreter imagines social and political life. This becomes
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1. Patrick Macklem, ConstitutionalIdeologies, 20 Ottawa L Rev 117, 119 (1988).
2. In R. v Big M DrugMart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 344, the Supreme Court described the purposive
approach:
the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character
and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific
right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable,
to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is
associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be ... a generous rather
than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for
individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection.
See also Law Society of Upper Canadav Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357; Hunter v Southam Inc., [ 1984] 2 SCR
145.
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especially apparent when laws exist in areas where there is considerable
conflict between competing values. Pornography and hate propaganda are
two such areas.
Recently, a series of decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada has
articulated some alternative perspectives on freedom of expression that are
more inclusive than exclusive, more communitarian than individualistic, and
more aware of the actual impacts of speech on the disadvantaged members of
society than have ever before been articulated in a freedom of expression
case. It is an approach that redistributes speech rights between unequal
groups. I am calling this series of decisions an equality approach to freedom
of expression. The approach is particularly evident in a recent trilogy of cases
dealing with hate propaganda; it is also evident in a strong line of cases
dealing with the definition of obscenity. This article discusses the Supreme
Court's treatment of extremist speech in light of the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and laws prohibiting
the public, wilful promotion of hatred and obscenity. As the constitutionality
of obscenity laws has yet to be determined by the Supreme Court, 3 I use the

recent pronouncements in the hate propaganda cases to argue that the
equality, harm-based rationale developed by the Court for the regulation of
hate propaganda even more strongly supports the regulation of pornography
as a practice of inequality. I will further argue that the competing
constitutional values as weighed and evaluated by the Supreme Court point
the way to a more inclusive, democratic, and egalitarian society, avoiding the
more limited view of freedoms that in past decisions have emphasized the
autonomy of individuals, weighed their competing claims as though they were
equal, and ignored the social realities in which they operated.
The argument that hate propaganda and pornography may be
constitutionally regulated on an equality theory engages sections 1, 2(b), 15,
4
27, and 28 of the Charter.
Section 1 of the Charter is the central, preeminent provision. It states that
the Charter "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstratively justified in
a free and democratic society." This is an unusual section if one compares it
with other national or international rights-protecting instruments. The
American Bill of Rights, for example, has no similar section. At first glance,
section 1 may appear to be inconsistent or contradictory. On the one hand, it
guarantees rights, yet, on the other, it authorizes limits on those rights in
certain circumstances. The presence of section 1 in the Charter requires the
analysis to be split into two distinct stages. The first stage requires a court to
determine the scope and content of the right and decide whether the right has
been breached. In the second stage, the court determines whether any
limitation on the right can be justified in the context of the free and
3.
4.

See R. v Butler, [1990] 1 WWR 97 (Man CA), rev'g [1989] 6 WWR 35 (Man QB).
Can Const (Constitution Act, 1982) pt I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
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democratic society of Canada. This double function embodies the idea that
constitutional rights in the Charter are not absolute.
The freedom of expression guarantee is found in section 2(b) of the
Charter, which provides that "[e]veryone has the following fundamental
freedoms: . . . freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication." The most
important substantive provision relevant to the egalitarian approach to
freedom of expression is section 15, the equality section. It, like section 1, is
distinctive compared to other national and international instruments that
exist to prohibit discrimination. It actually contains four equality guarantees,
an open-ended list of prohibited grounds, and an affirmative action provision
to allow for beneficial programs for disadvantaged groups or individuals. It
reads:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or physical or mental disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.

Section 27, a multicultural section, and section 28, a gender equality
section, are meant to assist in the interpretation of the Charter. They
emphasize that multiculturalism and gender equality are important Canadian
goals. Section 27 provides that the Charter "shall be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multi-cultural
heritage of Canadians." Section 28 further states that, "[n]otwithstanding
anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are
guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
II
HATE PROPAGANDA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:

THE KEEGSTRA CASE

Regina v. Keegstra 5 was heard in conjunction with two similar appeals,7
Regina v. Andrews and Smith 6 and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor.
Keegstra and Andrews raised the same issue: the constitutional validity of
section 319(2) of the Criminal Code,8 a provision that prohibits the wilful
promotion of hatred, other than in private conversation, towards any section
of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, or ethnic origin.9 Taylor
raised the issue of the constitutional validity of section 13(1) of the Canadian
5. [1990]3 SCR 697.
6. [1990] 3 SCR 870.
7. [1990] 3 SCR 892.
8. Criminal Code RSC, ch C-46, § 319(2) (1985).
9. Id. The relevant provisions of section 319 read as follows:
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation,
wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of
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Human Rights Act, a legislative provision that prohibits the communication of
hate messages over the telephone.' 0
In all three cases, the Court was asked to decide whether the legislation
infringed the guarantee of freedom of expression found in section 2(b) of the
Charter, and, if so, whether it could be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. Of the three, Keegstra was the leading decision in that it set out the
approach adopted by the majority in the other two cases. I therefore will
confine my remarks to the reasoning of the Court in that decision.
In Keegstra, the accused, James Keegstra, a high school teacher, used his
classroom time to communicate anti-semitic teachings to his students.'' He
was convicted at trial of the offence of the public, wilful promotion of group
hatred.12 The conviction was appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal, where
it was unanimously overturned, the court finding that section 319(2) of the
Criminal Code unjustifiably infringed Keegstra's freedom of expression as
guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter. 13 Speaking for the court, Judge
Kearns found that, although deliberate lies are not protected by section 2(b),
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2)
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;
(b) if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an opinion
upon a religious subject;
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of
which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be
true; or
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters
producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred towards an identifiable group in
Canada.
(6) No proceeding for an offence under subsection (2) shall be instituted without the
consent of the Attorney General.
(7) In this section,
"communicating" includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible
or visible means;
"identifiable group" has the same meaning as in section 318 [("any section of the
public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin," id § 318(4))];
"public place" includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by
invitation, express or implied;
"statements" includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electromagnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations.
10. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, ch H-6, § 13(1) as amended (1985).
11. The accused taught social studies courses to students in grades nine and 12 at Eckville High
School from the early 1970s until 1982. Through evidence given by former students, as well as
students' notebooks and essays written during courses, it was determined that the accused taught
antisemitic theories. Students were expected to take down what was said by the accused in class or
written by him on the blackboard, and they were expected to learn and reflect this information in the
form of essays and on exams. If their essays and exams contained the theories taught by him in class,
they received excellent marks. If, however, they used sources from outside his classroom such as
encyclopedias, dictionaries, and history books, they received poor grades. The accused taught only
his personal biased views and told the students they should accept his biased views as truth unless
they could contradict them. Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief, Her Majesty the Queen at 2,
Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697.
12. R. v Keegstra, 19 CCC (3d) 254 (Alta QB 1984).
13. R. v Keegstra, 87 AR 177 (CA 1988).
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innocently or negligently made hate speech is. Moving to the section 1
analysis, he said that, while he accepted that section 319(2) had the valid
legislative objective of preventing harm to the reputation and psychological
well-being of target group members, he nevertheless found the section
unconstitutional because the injury was not serious enough to require the
sanction of criminal law. In order to be constitutional, more than reputational
harm was required. Greater harm, such as proof of actual hatred being
caused as a result of the impugned expression, was necessary. Sections 15
and 27 of the Charter, the equality and multicultural sections, were not
viewed as justifying the hate propaganda laws under section 1. This decision
was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
A.

Keegstra's Section 2(b) Analysis

To determine whether or not the hate propaganda prohibition violated the
Charter, Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the majority, first examined the
scope of the freedom of expression section. He did so by looking at the
underlying values supporting the freedom of expression guarantee. Those
values, he said, are seeking and attaining the truth, encouraging and fostering
participation in social and political decisionmaking, and cultivating diversity
14
in forms of individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing.
After finding the scope of section 2(b) to be both large and liberal, the
Court adopted a strict categorical test,' 5 permitting content-based restrictions
only if the speech is communicated in a physically violent form. 1 6 Otherwise,
as long as an expressive activity conveys a meaning, it is protected by section
2(b), regardless of the meaning or message conveyed. The Court held that
17
even threats of violence are within the scope of the section's protection.
Governments may restrict expressive activity only when their purpose is other
than to restrict the content of the activity. Even if the purpose is directed
solely at the effect rather than the content of the expression, section 2(b) can
still be brought into play if the affected party can demonstrate that the activity
in question supports rather than undermines the principles and values upon
which freedom of expression is based. 18
Applying this categorical test to the hate propaganda provision, Chief
Justice Dickson found that the legislation prohibiting the public, wilful
14. R. v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 727 (relying on Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989]
1 SCR 927, 976, aff'g Ford v Quebec (Attorney General), [19881 2 SCR 712, 765-67).
15. Id at 728-29.
16. In RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 SCR 573, 588, the Supreme Court ruled that the
freedom of expression guarantee does not extend to acts of violence and threats of violence. In
Keegstra, the ChiefJustice, writing for the majority, clarified this exception, ruling that only meanings
communicated through the medium of violence will be excluded from § 2(b) protection. R. v
Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 731. The minority opinion, authored by Justice McLachlin, maintained that
threats of violence fall outside § 2(b) protection. Id at 826-27.

17. Reference re §§ 193 and 1985.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada (Alan) [1990] 15 CR 1123,
1181; Keegstra, [19901 3 SCR at 732. Justice McLachlin, joined by justices LaForest and Sopinka in
dissent, however, held that threats of violence do not attract § 2(b) protection. Id at 830-31.
18. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 762.
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promotion of group hatred did indeed infringe section 2(b) of the Charter.
He said the hate propaganda provision was an attempt by Parliament to
prohibit communication conveying meaning. The Chief Justice made the
point that competing values contained in other Charter provisions, such as
equality, multiculturalism, and Canada's international obligations to prohibit
hate propaganda, should not be balanced within the freedom of expression
guarantee at the first stage of analysis because the Court would not have the
benefit of making a contextual assessment and the analysis would be
dangerously and overly abstract.19 He said section 1 is the preferable place to
balance because it permits a contextual analysis that fully weighs the harm
hate speech inflicts on minorities.
At this point, the Court rejected the argument that hate propaganda is a
form of violence in and of itself,20 and, as an integral link in systemic
discrimination, 2 ' should be excluded from section 2(b) protection. It is
unfortunate that the Court significantly deviated from the purposive approach
to adopt a rigid form/content distinction in its interpretation of section 2(b).
While it is true that hate propaganda combines content and form (colour,
race, religion, or national origin are the content), when it takes the form of
wilful, public promotion of group hatred on the enumerated grounds, it
22
should be seen as a practice of inequality similar to racial segregation.
In Regina v. Andrews & Smith, 2 3 Justice Cory (as he then was) identified the
connection between hate propaganda and discrimination: "When expression
does instill detestation it . . . lays the foundation for the mistreatment of

members of the victimized group."-24 Viewed this way, it can be said that the
wilful, public promotion of group hatred is an act, an injury, and a
consequence itself. It is not a mere intention to act in the future. To promote
group hatred is to practice discrimination, and discrimination is an act that
contradicts one of the core values underlying freedom of expression,
individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing-the very value we are told
defines the environment in which all the goals of freedom of expression
should be pursued. 25 Under this view, regulation of hate propaganda should
not be invalidated by the doctrine of free speech any more than legal
26
regulation of racial segregation is invalidated by the same doctrine.
Enforcement of inequality results in injury just as violence does. Its violent
19. Id at 764-70.
20. Id at 770.
21. For a contrary view, see Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320 (1989); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133 (1982).
22. Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954), treated segregation as a form of racial
discrimination.
23. 65 OR (2d) 161 (Ont CA 1988).
24. Id at 179.
25. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 SCR at 967.
26. Kathleen A. Lahey, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Pornography: Toward a Theory of Actual
Gender Equality, 20 New Eng L Rev 649, 675 (1984-85), citing Catharine MacKinnon's Brief as Amicus
Curiae for Linda Marchiano 19-30, American Booksellers Assn v Hudnut, 598 F Supp 1316 (SD Ind 1984).
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nature ranges from immediate psychic wounding and attack to well27
documented consequent physical aggression.
At the very least, the Court should have viewed hate propaganda as
harassment on the basis of group membership. The courts in both Canada
and the United States have accepted that harassment is a practice of inequality
resulting in legally recognized harm and loss, even when it consists solely of
words. It is a form of discrimination, even if the action is words. When
legislatures regulate harassment, they do not regulate the content of
expression, although the expression has content. The Court treats
harassment as a practice of inequality. 2 8 Hate propaganda, which is a
particularly virulent form of harassment, should be treated similarly.
A purposive approach, if applied as it was in earlier Supreme Court
decisions, would lead to the conclusion that hate propaganda is an abuse of
freedom of expression beyond the contemplation of the Charter. 2 9 At this
stage of the analysis, the Supreme Court incorporated a strict categorical
approach for the Canadian constitutional context without providing
convincing reasons for doing so. The purposive approach to rights protection
under the Charter developed prior to Irwin Toy, which said the judiciary
evolves the content of the right from the nature of the interests it is meant to
protect, would seem to require more.3 0 For example, the majority of the
Court says violence in the form of murder or rape would not be protected
under section 2(b), but it fails to tell us why. 3 ' Surely the reason is that such
expression does not recognize or respect human dignity and autonomy and is
inimical to the rule of law. While the Court acknowledges that some wordless
human activity can have meaning and must be protected under section 2(b), it
does not seem to recognize that the corollary is also true. That is, activity that
takes the form of expression can also be devoid of meaning in the
constitutional sense. 32 The denial of equality rights through the
discriminatory practice of promoting hatred arguably deserves the same
constitutional consideration under section 2(b) as does violence. Because the
text of the Charter focuses on expression as the medium of thought that
manifests the individuality and common humanity of right holders, the wilful
promotion of hatred should have no constitutional significance.
27. Center for Democratic Renewal, They Don't All Wear Sheets: A Chronology of Racist and Far Right
Violence, 1980-1986 (Div Church & Society, Nati Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, 1987)
(documenting violent racist incidents over several years in 48 states) (compiled by Chris Lutz).
28. Janzen and Govereau v Platy Enterprises Ltd. et al, [1989] 1 SCR 1252; Robichaud v Canada, [1987]
2 SCR 84. See Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace of Working Women (Yale U
Press, 1979), for the seminal work on this topic.
29. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR at 344.
30. See in particular Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145.
31. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 763.
32. Lorraine Weinrib makes a similar argument in a different context in Does Money Talk?
Commercial Expression in the Canadian Constitutional Context, in David Schneiderman, ed, Freedom of
Expression and the Charter 336, 348 (Carswell, 1991); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Hate Promotion in a Free and
Democratic Society, 36 McGill LJ 1416, 1419 (1991).
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Had the Court viewed the content/form distinction as points on a
continuum rather than as discernibly distinct categories, it could have taken a
more nuanced, sensitive, and practical approach to forms of speech that
should not be dignified or legitimized by Charter protection. Speech activity
such as pornography, racist signs, sexual and racial harassment, as well as hate
propaganda fall on this continuum.
Social-psychologist Gordon Allport's analysis of the harms of prejudice is
convincing. His analysis supports a continuum approach rather than the
categorical approach and appeals to common sense and historical experience.
According to Allport, there are five stages of racial prejudice: expression of
prejudicial attitudes, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and
extermination.3 3 Each stage depends on and is connected to the preceding
one. Allport uses as an example the history of the Third Reich:
It was Hitler's antilocution that led Germans to avoid their Jewish neighbours and
erstwhile friends. This preparation made it easier to enact the Nuremburg laws of
discrimination which, in turn, made the subsequent burning of synagogues and street
natural. The final step in the macabre progression was the
attacks upon Jews seem
34
ovens at Auschwitz.

It is this progressive, interdependent connection of hate propaganda and
violence that cannot be contemplated within the "violent form" limitation on
content regulation as articulated in Irwin Toy. The category of "violent form"
is thus unhelpful and even misleading. Without more convincing reasons, the
deviation from the purposive approach introduces unnecessary rigidity into
section 2(b) interpretation. The effect of the narrow exclusion not only
dignifies vicious, harmful speech activity, it progressively erodes expression
rights by increasing the frequency of policy-oriented decisions performed in
section 1. Ultimately, using section 1 in this way may soften the stringency of
its requirements, deny meaningful content to section 2(b), and trivialize the
35
Charter guarantee of freedom of expression.
B.

Keegstra's Section 1 Analysis

Having determined that the public, wilful promotion of group hatred as a
category falls within the protection of section 2(b) and that the criminal
prohibition infringed James Keegstra's freedom of expression, the Court
turned to consider whether under section 1 the infringement was a reasonable
limit demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. The Court
split four to three in finding that the burden of section 1 was satisfied and that
the legislation could be upheld.
The analysis followed in the format set out by Regina v. Oakes. 3 6 In
determining that the impugned law relates to pressing and substantial
33.
Bottos,
Alberta
34.
35.

36.

Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 14-15 (Addison-Wesley, 1954), cited in Dino
Keegstra and Andrews: A Commentary on Hate Propaganda and the Freedom of Expression, 27
L Rev 461, 471 (1989).
Allport, The Vature of Preudice at 14 (cited in note 33).
See The Queen v Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, [19911 1 SCR 139 (McLachlin).

[1986] 1 SCR 103, 136.
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concerns, three reasons were articulated. The first focused on the harm
caused by hate propaganda. Chief Justice Dickson stressed that extremist
hate speech is not merely offensive; it causes "real" and "grave" harm to both
its target groups and society at large. Like sexual harassment, hate
propaganda constitutes a serious attack on psychological and emotional
health. Members of the target groups are humiliated and degraded, their self
worth is undermined, and they are encouraged to withdraw from the
community and deny their own personal identity. The majority described
hate propaganda's societal harm as causing serious discord between cultural
groups and creating an atmosphere conducive to discrimination and
37
violence.
It is worth noting that the majority rejected the American "clear and
present danger" test of harm, saying it and other categorizations generated by
American law may be inappropriate to Canadian constitutional theory. 38 This
is a welcome clarification in the law. It not only clears up the confusion
caused by differing opinions in the lower courts,3 9 it recognizes that serious
harms that need to be addressed by the criminal law do not in general entail
such an identifiable danger point or necessarily lend themselves to a "clear
and present danger" type of classification. The harms caused by hate
propaganda are often difficult to detect, either immediately or ever. Hate
propaganda has subtle effects. It relies on fear and ignorance to engender
indoctrination over time. It works by socializing, by establishing the expected
and the permissible. Any requirement to prove "clear and present danger" or
scientifically verifiable harm not only ignores the realities of the crime, it
ensures that very few, if any, convictions will ever be obtained. By rejecting
the "clear and present danger" test, the Court made it quite clear that dry and
sterile analytic techniques 40 that effectively predetermine the issue will not be
4
imported into Canada. '
A second, related reason the provisions were found by the majority to be
of pressing and substantial concern was the importance of the Canadian
commitment to equality and multiculturalism reflected in sections 15 and 27
of the Charter. The majority situated section 27 in an equality context, saying
that attacks on groups need to be prevented because group discrimination can
adversely affect its individual members. 4 2 According to the Court, in
restricting hate propaganda, Parliament seeks "to bolster the notion of
37. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 744-49.
38. Id at 743.
39. For example, Justice Kearns, speaking for the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta in
Keegstra said that in order for the hate propaganda provisions to meet the proportionality test, the law
would have to require the successful promotion of hate; otherwise, the harm would not be serious
enough to justify infringements on the freedom of expression guarantee. R. v Keegstra, [ 1988] 87 AR
177, 181. On the other hand, while not conceding the point that hate propaganda causes real harm,
Justice Cory (as he then was) of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in the Andrews case, cited numerous
examples of laws that prohibit activities that carry a risk of harm (that is, impaired driving, attempted
murder, conspiracy) but where harm need not occur. R. v Andrews, [1988] 65 OR2d 161, 187.
40. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv L Rev 4, 10 (1936).
41. Keegstra, 3 SCR at 740-44.
42. Id at 746.
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mutual respect necessary in a nation which venerates the equality of all
persons."-43 This reasoning is not dissimilar to that of the United States
Supreme Court in Beauharnaisv. Illinois,4 4 to which the Chief Justice referred
in Keegstra,4 5 suggesting that the Beauharnais decision is closer to the Canadian
approach to freedom of expression than the line of cases that subsequently
undermined it.46 The Chief Justice cautioned that even though current
American free speech doctrine may be helpful in many respects, it is of
dubious applicability in the context of a challenge to hate propaganda
legislation.
The Chief Justice is entirely correct on this point. The Charter is not
constrained by the textual or political constitutional imperatives of the
American first amendment, but more importantly the fundamental structure,
historical, and circumstantial differences between the two constitutions
require a distinctively Canadian approach. 4 7 Although both countries share a
democratic ideal, they do not share the same view of social and political life.
In sociological terms, Canada and the United States experience some of the
same realities of heterogeneity of population, of language differences, and of
original native population. 4 8 In this dimension, definition and reconciliation
of minority rights have been central to civil liberties politics in both countries.
But a major ideological difference is Canada's rejection of the melting pot
approach to cultural diversity adopted in the United States in favour of a
mosaic approach. One of the objectives of the drafters of the Charter was to
develop a bilingual, multicultural country and a pluralistic mosaic. 4 9
As a result, Charter commitments are different in many respects from the
commitments of the American Bill of Rights. The multicultural section is a
case in point. Section 27 states that the Charter shall be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the
multicultural heritage of Canadians. 50 This provision is particularly
important when courts are required to balance the freedom of expression of
hate propagandists against the multiculturalism ideal and the powerful
equality provision. It is thus much broader in scope than the fourteenth
amendment, containing wider substantive protections as well as more
43. Id at 756.
44. 343 US 250 (1952).
45. [1990] 3 SCR at 739.
46. Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith v FCC, 403 F2d 169, 174 (DC Cir 1968); Collin v Smith,
587 F2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir 1978).
47. Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, 498; compare to Collin v Smith, 587 F2d 1197 (7th
Cir 1978).
48. For a further discussion, see Alan F. Westin, The United States Bill of Rights and the Canadian
Charter: A Socio-PoliticalAnalysis, in William McKeacher, ed, The U.S. Bill of Rights and the Canadian
Charier of Rights 27 (Economic Council, 1983).
49. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of
Canada: Final Report (Queen's Printer, 1972). The minutes state that the purpose of a multicultural
provision would be "[t]o develop Canada as a bilingual and multicultural country in which all its
citizens, male and female, young and old, native peoples and Mtis, and all groups from ethnic
origins feel equally at home."
50. Charter § 27.
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prohibited grounds of discrimination. 5 ' Section 15(2) of the Charter
expressly adds a clause that legitimizes affirmative action in the constitutional
definition of equality rights. 52 Reading section 15 together with the
multiculturalism section creates a formidable obstacle for those who would
use the freedom of expression guarantee to promote hatred against
identifiable groups.
The other minority interests protected in the Charter-including language
and education rights, aboriginal rights, and rights for denominationally
the strong commitment to
separate dissentient schools 5 3-underline
collective rights in the Charter that is not evident in the American
Constitution. Against this background, it is not surprising the Court found
the prohibition of the public, wilful promotion of group hatred is a matter of
pressing and substantial concern sufficient to meet the section 1
requirements.
To further emphasize the point that hate propaganda laws relate to
pressing and substantial concerns, the Court took note of international
human rights obligations that require Canada to suppress hate propaganda
criminally to protect identifiable and vulnerable groups. 54 The Court said
that when values such as equality and freedom from racism enjoy status as
international human rights, they are generally ascribed a high degree of
importance under section 1.5 5 The United States has not ratified this or
similar conventions.
The connections the Canadian Supreme Court makes between
institutional arrangements, collective and individual harms, human relations,
and equality are very important elements in its equality approach to freedom
of expression. The centrality of equality to the enjoyment of individual as
well as group rights emphasizes that the main constitutional consideration
surrounding extremist speech is the harm it causes to equality interests. The
Court is clear that if we are to live in a society without discrimination, the
harm of hate speech must be redressed.
The majority again referred to harm in applying proportionality, the
second portion of the Oakes test. The Court made the point that hate
propaganda is only tenuously connected to the values underlying section 2(b),
56
because the harm of hate speech is significant and the truth value marginal.
51. Section 15(1) states: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability."
52. Section 15(2) states that § 15(1) does not preclude laws designed to ameliorate conditions of
disadvantaged groups and individuals.
53. Charter §§ 21, 25, 35, 29.
54. See article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (New York, Aug 24, 1966), entered into force for Canada,Jan 4, 1969, Canada Treaty
Series 1970 No 28.
55. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 750, citing Slaight Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] I SCR
1038, 1056.
56. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 761.
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In assessing hate propaganda against the fundamental values underlying the
freedom of expression guarantee, the Court found it to be an illegitimate
form of political speech that loses its democratic aspirations to the free
expression guarantee because the ideas it propagates are anathema to
democratic values. Moreover, the Court found that hate speech undermines
the value of protecting and fostering a vibrant democracy because it denies
citizens equality and meaningful participation in the political process and its
contribution to self-fulfilment and human flourishing is negligible. Hate
speech not only chills or denies freedom of expression to those it targets, it
undercuts the self-development and human flourishing among all members of
57
society by engendering intolerance and prejudice.
The minority, on the other hand, believed some hate speech could be
important. 58 It feared that regulations on hate propaganda could start a
"slippery slope" of encroachment on valuable political speech or could catch
angry speech by members of disadvantaged minority groups against dominant
majorities. The Chief Justice was of the view that the mens rea requirement
would restrict the reach of the provision to only those groups meant to be
caught by

it. 5 9

Perhaps a stronger argument is that the contextualized

approach serves as a sufficient safeguard to isolate extremist hate speech from
legitimate political speech. Constitutional equality as interpreted by the
Court in Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia60 is essentially designed
to protect the groups that suffer social, political, and legal disadvantage. If
hate propaganda were directed against historically dominant group members,
a contextual approach would constitutionally protect it even in the section 1
balance. This is appropriate because the attack would not be linked to the
perpetuation of disadvantage. It would be tied to the structural domination of
the group attacked. If the groups were equal, presumably any special
protection would be removed.
Finally, the Court examined the relationship between the equality rights in
the Charter and the freedom of expression guarantee. While acknowledging
that section 15 of the Charter does not itself guarantee social equality, the
Court nevertheless made it clear that equal law is seen as a means to an equal
society, as well as an end in itself. The Court's statement that "the principles
underlying section 15 of the Charter are . . . integral to the section 1
analysis"'6 I requires section 15 to have a broader constitutional function than
protecting individuals from state-imposed discrimination. The Keegstra Court
clearly established that just as Charter rights can be used to challenge
legislation, they can be used to uphold existing legislation that furthers
section 15 values. In the words of Chief Justice Dickson, "[i]nsofar as it
indicates our society's dedication to promoting equality, section 15 is also
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 763-65.
Id at 859 (McLachlin dissenting).
Id at 774-76.
[1989] I SCR 143, 154 (Wilson, Dickson, and L'Heureux-Dub
Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 756.

concurring).
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relevant in assessing the aims of section 319(2) of the Criminal Code under
section 1.' ' 62 The Court cited with approval the written submissions of the
intervenor, Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), which stated:
Government sponsored hatred on group grounds would violate section 15 of the
Charter. Parliament promotes equality and moves against inequality when it prohibits
the wilful public promotion of group hatred on these grounds. It follows that
government action against group hate, because it promotes social equality as
guaranteed
by the Charter, deserves special constitutional consideration under section
6
15. 3

Similarly, the Court took account of section 27 and its recognition that
Canada possesses a multicultural society in which the diversity and richness of
various cultural groups is a value to be protected and enhanced. The equality
section and the multicultural section read with the hate propaganda
provisions within section 1 were sufficient to outweigh the freedom of
expression interest in the propagation of hatred and establish equality as a
pre-eminent value in Canadian society.
The approach established by the Keegstra decision in the section 1
balancing stage legitimated group rights to the extent that they outweighed
the competing individual right of freedom of expression. This was due to the
influence of section 15.64 The recognition that the harm of discrimination can
outweigh the free speech interest marks a major new development in freedom
of expression jurisprudence. The connections the Court made between
institutional arrangements, collective and individual harms, human relations,
and equality are unique. The Court's recognition that boundaries between
individual and collective rights must be confronted demonstrates the
Charter's potential to propose new relationships.
Canada's departure from American free speech doctrine is clear. Under
the first amendment, social reality is not considered when legislation
regulating extremist speech is challenged. 6 5 This is a critical difference from
the Canadian practice because, depending on the facts of the case, a
contextual analysis can result in a right or freedom having a different value.
In Keegstra, when assessing the value of challenged expression, the Court
looked at the reality of the situation at hand, including the nature of the
interests at stake. The centrality of equality to the enjoyment of individual as
well as group rights in the decision demonstrates a firm acceptance of the view
that equality is a positive right, that the Charter's equality provision has a
large remedial component, and that legislatures should take positive
measures to improve the status of disadvantaged groups. Most importantly,
Keegstra identifies a transformation potential in the Charter, a potential to
62. Id at 755.
63. Id.
64. Justice Wilson in R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296, 1333, said that § 15 is designed to protect
those groups that suffer social, political, and legal disadvantage in our society.
65. See Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852 (ED Mich 1989); Penelope Seator, Judicial
Indifference to Pornography's Harm: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 17 Golden Gate U L Rev 297
(1987).
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achieve social change toward the creation of a society based on an ethic that
responds to needs, honours difference, and rejects abstractions.
The next section of the article deals with pornography and how it relates
to the definition and constitutionality of obscenity laws in the Canadian
context. 66 The relationships between pornography and hate propaganda, and
the relevancy of Keegstra to some future constitutional challenge of obscenity
laws are discussed.
ETBT3 Tr /F5 1 T373.2 Tm (ANDETBT3 Tj10.9
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Canada on the constitutional ground that section 163 of the Criminal Code
violates section 2(b) of the Charter.
The same method of analysis as that used in Keegstra will apply to
determine the constitutionality of obscenity laws. First, the scope of freedom
of expression will be examined to see if the legislation violates the expression
guarantee. If it does, it will be tested against the section 1 standard to see
whether it constitutes a reasonable limit prescribed by law (as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society). On the basis of
Keegstra, an equality, harms-based theory should be able to regulate
pornography constitutionally under sections 1, 2(b), 15, and 28 of the
Charter.
The contextualized approach to equality adopted by the Supreme Court in
Andrews will establish that the sex equality interest in pornography's
regulation arises out of the harms it causes. There are at least three
arguments to make: First, some pornography is made through the use of
force, violence, or coercion. As such, it is a "violent form" of expression and
is excluded from the scope of section 2(b) protection. Second, some
pornography is not protected under section 2(b) by virtue of section 28.
Third, and in the alternative, to the extent the obscenity laws are interpreted
to promote sex equality, any restraints they impose on expression are
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. Each of the
arguments is dealt with in turn.
A.

Pornography as a Violent Form of Expression

In considering the scope of the freedom of expression guarantee in
Keegstra, the Supreme Court concluded two things: the purpose of the hate
propaganda laws is to restrict content of expression, and hate speech does not
amount to a violent form of expression. The Court found that, while Mr.
Keegstra's ideas were unsettling and demeaning in the extreme, they did not
amount to a violent form of expression because they did not urge actual or
threatened physical interference in the same sense that violence was
characterized in Dolphin Delivery 69 and Irwin Toy. 70 As a result, the analysis of
the legitimacy of hate propaganda laws took place within section 1.
The Court should come to a different conclusion when evaluating
pornography within section 2(b). While hate propaganda and pornography
are similar in some respects, they have qualitative differences. They are
similar in their express or implied intent, which is to distort the image of a
group or class of people, to deny their humanity, and to make them such
objects of ridicule and humiliation that acts of aggression against them are
viewed less seriously. 7' The major difference between them is the method
69. [1986] 2 SCR 573.
70. [1989] 1 SCR 927.
71. Susan Brownmiller compares pornography to hate propaganda against Jews and blacks,
finding strong similarities in content, yet differences in society's reaction to them. Whereas racist
hate propaganda is disparaged, pornography is ideologically encouraged. See Susan Brownmiller,
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used to achieve the desired results. In some pornography, sexual use and
abuse of women are direct, visual portrayals. Unlike most hate propaganda,
pornography often involves real violence where women are coerced and
sexually assaulted so that they become the subjects of pornography. 72 When
overt infliction of pain, overt use of force, or the threat of either of them is
used in the production of pornography, its purely violent nature should bring
it within the "violent form" category. 73 Furthermore, mass marketing of
sexual assault as a form of "entertainment" provides a profit motive for
physically harming people. Clearly this is a more serious, immediate harm
than the harms identified by the majority in Keegstra. Pornography that is
made from assaults should be no more worthy of protection as expression
than the assaults themselves. Obscenity laws, properly interpreted,
criminalize this type of pornography not because of any meaning it may have,
74
but because of the direct harm it causes to the participants.
Where the government's aim is not to limit freedom of expression but to
accomplish another goal, then the person complaining about the
infringement must show that its effect was to infringe his or her constitutional
freedom. 7 5 It will be very difficult for pornographers to make an argument
that pornography produced through the use of violence, force, or coercion
meets any of the values underlying the freedom of expression guarantee.
Justice McLachlin's dissent in Keegstra explained that violence or threats of
violence must be excluded from Charter protection because they are inimical
to the rule of law upon which all rights and freedoms depend. 7 6 This
approach is consistent with the way the U.S. Supreme Court deals with child
pornography. In New York v. Ferber,77 the Court upheld a statute that
criminalizes the distribution of child pornography. It looked at the process by
which child pornography is made and concluded that it inflicts psychological
and physical harm on children and is a form of child abuse. 78 Moreover, the
Court found that the harm to children is exacerbated by circulation of pictures
of the abuse. As a result, the sex pictures also are regarded as child abuse.
Through Ferber, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld criminal convictions for the
Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, in Laura Lederer, ed, Take Back the Night: Women on
Pornography 30-35 (Morrow, 1980).
72. Final Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography 747-56, 767-1035 (U.S.
Govt Printing Office, 1986) ("Final Report").
73. Matsuda, 87 Mich L Rev 2320 (cited in note 21); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:
Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 Harv Women's LJ 1, 5 (1985) (discussing the pornographic
portrayal of women being killed and mutilated, and the direct connection between pornography and
violence).
74. Lahey describes how extensive evidence of harm to women participating in the production
of pornography was adduced in American Booksellers v. Hudnut. Lahey, 20 New Eng L Rev 649 (cited in
note 26). See also Public Hearings regarding an Ordinance to add pornography as discrimination
against women, the Government Operations Committee of the Minneapolis City Council (Dec 12-13,
1983). The testimony before the hearings also included social science evidence of pornography's
harm.
75. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697.
76. Id at 830-31 (McLachlin dissenting).
77. 458 US 747 (1982).
78. Id at 758.
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entire chain of sale, distribution, and possession of child pornography as a
means of eliminating its harms. The Court also recognized that harm can
extend to third parties when child abusers use the pornography to abuse
other children. 79 The Court reasoned that the obscenity test enunciated in
Miller"0 was irrelevant to the issue of whether a child is physically or
psychologically harmed in the production of pornography.
Women forced into the production of pornography or assaulted in it
should receive the same protection. In the context of historic disadvantage on
the basis of sex and age, both women and children are vulnerable, and both
experience the same kind of harm to produce the same kind of expression, for
the same purposes.
In some pornography, there is an inherent threat of violence that takes
away women's choices and undermines their freedom of action. For example,
positive outcome rape scenarios that portray rape as pleasurable for the victim
are known to increase the risk of violence against women. In laboratory
settings, social scientists have found that exposure to such scenarios increases
aggression against women, increases attitudes that are related to violence
against women in the real world, and increases self-reported likelihood to
rape. A significant percentage of men exposed to such materials come to
believe that violence against women is acceptable. 8 ' Materials that create
such effects constitute direct threats of violence against women and, for the
reasons cited by Justice McLachlin, should be excluded from constitutional
protection. The majority decision in Keegstra, however, would preclude such a
finding, as threats were found to fall within the protective ambit of section
2(b). One hopes the Court will reconsider this decision in Butler. The
ramifications of protecting threats of violence as constitutional speech make
the underlying free speech rationale of democracy and truth meaningless.

79. Osborne v Ohio, 495 US 103, 110 (1990).
80. Miller v California, 413 US 15, 34 (1974). The Court in Miller said the test for determining
whether something is legally obscene is that which
the average person applying contemporary community standards "would find that
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... [that] depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and [that],
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Id at 34.
81. Edward Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effect on Violence Against Women, in Neil Malamuth &
Edward Donnerstein, eds, Pornography and Sexual Aggression 53 (Academic Press, 1984); Edward
Donnerstein & Leon Berkovitz, Victim Reaction in Aggressive Erotic Films as a Factor in Violence Against
Women, 41 J Personality & Social Psych 710 (1981); Neil Malamuth, Factors Associated with Rape as
Predators of Laboratory Aggression Against Women, 45 J Personality & Social Psych 432 (1983); Neil
Malamuth, Predictions of Naturalistic Sexual Aggression, 50 J Personality & Social Psych 953 (1986); Neil
Malamuth & James V. P. Check, Aggressive-Pornographyand Beliefs in Rape Myths: Individual Differences,
19 J Research in Personality 299 (1985); James V. P. Check & Ted H. Guloien, Reported Proclivityfor
Coercive Sex Following Repeated Exposure to Sexually Violent Pornography, Nonviolent Dehumanizing
Pornography, and Erotica, in Dolf Zillmann & Jennings Bryant, eds, Pornography: Research Advances and
Policy Considerations 159 (Erlbaum, 1989); Michael McManus, Introduction, in Final Report at xviii (cited
in note 72) (consensus of all researchers as released by Surgeon General Koop).
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Pornography Is Not Protected Expression by Virtue of Section 28

On its face, it is clear that section 28 overrides every other provision in the
Charter. It is unconditional: "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the
rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and
female persons." Clearly this language mandates that all rights and freedoms,
including freedom of expression and equality rights, are guaranteed equally
to women and men. From its wording, it is difficult to come to any other
conclusion than that section 28 engages section 2(b) prior to any recourse to
section 1 and requires a balancing of speech and sex equality interests. Thus
section 28 should be able to constrain the operation of section 2(b) to the
extent that freedom of expression cannot be expanded when it would have the
effect of increasing sex inequality. In other words, if pornography is
recognized as a practice of sex discrimination, it follows that freedom of
expression cannot be expanded within section 2(b) to protect it if the effect
will be to promote or perpetuate the subordinate status of women.
Moreover, section 15 read with section 28 guarantees women equal access
to equality rights. Constitutional equality is concerned with eliminating the
disadvantage of historically subordinated groups.8 2 This means that the
Charter is not neutral on practices that promote inequality, but rather has a
commitment to ending them. At the very least, before the protection of
section 2(b) can be claimed, section 28 should require the pornographer
asserting speech rights to demonstrate that the subject materials do not limit
women's equality rights.
In Keegstra, section 28 was not a factor, nor were coercion and violence
present in the materials considered. In considering section 27, the
multicultural section of the Charter, Chief Justice Dickson states, however,
that "multiculturalism cannot be preserved let alone enhanced if free rein is
given to the promotion of hatred against identifiable cultural groups." 8 3 The
argument is stronger in relation to section 28: equality cannot be guaranteed
equally to male and female persons if free rein is given to pornography.
C.

The Analysis under Section 1: Pornography Is Protected Expression
but Justifiably Regulated by Obscenity Laws

Pornography that does not exhibit explicit or implicit violence in its
production but which is covered under the obscenity provision will fall to be
considered within section 1.
Section l's function is to balance tensions between harms. When
obscenity laws collide with the freedom of.expression guarantee, the state
must prove that the rights or interests protected by the law outweigh the
expression right infringed. The equality approach adopted in Keegstra will
require a balancing of the harms that flow from regulating expression by
obscenity laws against harms actualized through the promotion of women's
82.
83.

See Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR 143.
Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR at 758.
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inequality in pornography. In deciding on the proper balance, courts must be
guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society,
which include respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political
institutions that enhance the participation of individuals and groups in
84
society.
The section 1 analysis requires several steps. First, the objectives of the
obscenity provisions must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding
the constitutionally protected right of freedom of expression in pornography.
Second, if such an objective is established, the state must show that the means
chosen to attain the objective are reasonably and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society. To conclude that the means chosen are
reasonable and demonstrably justified, the Court must be satisfied of three
things: The measures designed to meet the legislative objective must be
rationally connected to the objective; the means used should impair as little as
possible the right and freedom in question; and there must be proportionality
between the effect of the measures that limit the Charter right or freedom and
85
the legislative objective.
1. The Legislative Objective-Is It a Pressing and Substantial Concern? The
obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code seek to prohibit the portrayal,
depiction, or description of matters, of which the dominant characteristic is
the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and one or more of several subjects,
87
namely, crime, horror, cruelty, and violence.8 6 The Wagner line of cases
held that Parliament's objective is to protect women from the harms resulting
from violent, dehumanizing, or degrading depictions. This notion is implicit
in Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. Regina,8 8 in which the Supreme Court stated
that the definition of "undue" must encompass publications that portray
persons in a degrading manner.8 9 Whether the legislation will meet the
pressing and substantial concern test will depend upon how seriously the
Court views the harms that are actualized through the promotion of women's
84. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
85. Keegstra, 3 SCR at 735-38 (Chief Justice Dickson). In his discussion of the role of § 1, the
ChiefJustice also stressed that it is misleading to conceive of § 1 as a rigid and technical provision.
He said it plays an immeasurably richer role embracing not only Charter values, but all values
associated with a free and democratic society. There must be an awareness of the synergistic
relationship between the values underlying the Charter and the circumstances of the particular case.
86. Criminal Code § 163(8).
87. R. v Doug Rankine Co, 36 CR (3d) 154 (1983), 9 CCC (3d) 53 (Ont Co Ct); R. v Nicols, 43 CR
(3d) 54 (1984), 17 CCC (3d) 555 (Ont Co Ct); R. v Ramsingh, 14 CCC (3d) 230 (1984), 29 Man R (2d)
110 (Man QB); R. v Wagner, 43 CR (3d) 318 (Alta QB, 1985), aff'd, 50 CR (3d) 175 (Alta CA, 1986),
leave denied, 50 CR (3d) 175 (SCC); R. v Red Hot Video Ltd., 45 CR (3d) 36 (1985), 18 CCC (3d) I
(BCCA), leave denied, 46 CR (3d) xxv (SCC); R. v Fringe Product Inc., 53 CCC (3d) 422 (Ont Dist Ct,
1990).
88. [1985] I SCR 494.
89. Id at 505.
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inequality through pornography and the context in which pornography is
assessed.
Here, as in the section 2(b) analysis, pornography makes a stronger case
for regulation than hate propaganda does. Pornography is much more
commonplace, socially accepted, and widely distributed across class, race, and
geographical boundaries than hate propaganda is, and it exists in a societal
context of pervasive sex inequality. It follows that the harm of pornography
must be deeper, wider, and more damaging to social life than the harm of hate
propaganda. When pornography is prohibited, equality is promoted.
The finding in Keegstra that serious and real harms are caused by
discriminatory expression 9 ° is consistent with the findings of numerous social
science studies and commissions that have reported on the specific harms of
pornography. They all acknowledge that while a causal link between
pornography and direct harm cannot be scientifically proven, the proof is
clear that pornography reinforces sexual attitudes and behaviour antithetical
to equality rights and contributes to violent and dangerous behaviour. 9 1
One of the many statements describing the discriminatory effects of
pornography is found in the Report on Pornography by the Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs ("MacGuigan Report"):
The effect of this type of material is to reinforce male-female stereotypes to the
detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make degradation, humiliation, victimization,
and violence in human relationships appear normal and acceptable. A society which
holds that egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism, and mutuality are basic to any
human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justified in controlling and
prohibiting9 2any medium of depiction, description or advocacy which violates these
principles.
A

similar but stronger view of the harm of pornography was expressed by

Judge Frank Easterbrook in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut:
[P]ornography affects thoughts. Men who see women depicted as subordinate are
more likely to treat them so. Pornography is an aspect of dominance. It does not
persuade people so much as change them. It works by socializing, by establishing the
expected and the permissible. In this view, pornography is not an idea; pornography is the
injury.

90. See discussion at notes 67-69 and accompanying text; see also notes 33-38 and
accompanying text.
91. See Metropolitan Toronto Task Force on Public Violence against Women and Children,
Final Report 74 (1984) ("Metro Final Report"); Diane E. H. Russell, Pornography and Rape: A Causal
Model, 9 Political Psych 41 (1988); Pornography and Violence: What Does the New Research Say?, in

Lederer, ed, Take Back the Night at 218 (cited in note 71); Malamuth & Donnerstein, eds, Pornography
and Sexual Aggression (cited in note 81); Donald L. Mosher & Harvey Katz, Pornographic Films, Male
Verbal Aggression Against Women, and Guilt, in 8 Technical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and

Pornography (US Govt Printing Office, 197 1); McManus, Introduction (cited in note 81). Report of the
Joint Select Committee on Video Material, Commonwealth of Australia (Aust Govt Publishing
Service, 1988).
92. Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Report on Pornography 18:4 (Minister of
Supply and Services, 1978). Similar findings were made in Pornography and Prostitution in Canada:
Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution 95-103 (Minister of Supply and
Services, 1985) ("Fraser Report"), and in Final Report at 747-56, 767-1035 (cited in note 72).
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Depiction of subordination tends to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate
status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at
93
home, battery and rape on the streets.

Judge Easterbrook was very clear in his finding that pornography is more
than expression or representational material depicting the subordination of
women. His words indicate that pornography does not just subordinate
women representationally, it does so actually. 9 4
When the Court inquires into the larger social, political, and legal context
of women's experience, as it must do in Butler,9 5 the broader discriminatory
effects will be obvious. 9 6 Women's experience in the larger context includes
rape, battery, prostitution, incest, and sexual harassment as part of daily life.
Compared to men, women are profoundly unequal socially, politically, and
individually. The encouragement and promotion of subordination in
pornography in this broader context, particularly the depictions of violence
and exploitation of women at the hands of men, reinforces the systemic
violence and the social harm.
Stereotyping and stigmatization of historically disadvantaged groups were
recognized as harms deserving of sanction in Keegstra because the Court found
that they shape the social image and reputation of group members, often
controlling their opportunities more powerfully than individual abilities do.
The vast proliferation and sheer volume of pornography compared to hate
propaganda makes the harm to women's credibility, safety, and opportunities
much more serious and generalized. 97
The pronouncements of the Supreme Court about the importance of
equality in a free and democratic society and the need to protect vulnerable
groups from real harm caused by expression9" should ensure that the pressing
and substantial requirement of the Oakes test 9 9 will be met.
The pressing and substantial concern requirement will be further
bolstered by section 28, which creates an overriding exception to section 2(b).
As noted above, section 28 states that, "notwithstanding anything in the
93. 771 F2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir 1985) (emphasis added), aff'd, 475 US 1001 (1986).
94. This view has been put forward by leading feminist theorists, such as Catharine MacKinnon
in many of her excellent publications including Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard U Press,
1989); Susan Brownmiller, Against our Will: Men, Women and Rape 441-45 (Simon and Shuster, 1975);
Andrea Dworkin, in numerous articles and books, including 8 Harv Women's LJ at I (cited in note
73). In spite of this strong conclusion about the injurious nature of pornography, Judge Easterbrook
and the rest of the Seventh Circuit denied that any governmental effort to censor pornography on
the ground of harm to women as a class asserted in the case could possibly withstand a constitutional
challenge. Hudnut, 771 F2d at 329. For a comprehensive critique of the judgment, see Seator, 17
Golden Gate U L Rev 297 (cited in note 65).
95. This requirement was set out in Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR at 1331. The Supreme Court of
Canada said that in assessing whether a group is discriminated against, inquiry must be directed into
"the larger social, political and legal context," and enumerated "indicia of discrimination such as
stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice." Id at 1333.
96. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 645-49.
97. Thelma McCormick, Making Sense of Research on Pornography, in Metro Final Report at 37
(cited in note 91).
98. See text accompanying notes 68-71.
99. Oahes, [1986] 1 SCR at 139.
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Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to
male and female persons." If pornography cannot be excluded from section
2(b) protection because it conveys meaning, then the guarantee of sex
equality within section 28 must be contemplated within section 1. According
to section 28, sex equality is unconditional. As such, it cannot be tempered by
any other provisions in the Charter. What this means is that section 28 must
weigh in the balance of section I to the extent that no freedom or right should
override legislation when it would have the effect of increasing sex inequality.
Once the discriminatory effects of pornography are understood, it follows that
freedom of expression cannot be expanded within section 1 where the effect
will be to perpetuate or promote women's subordinate status.' 0 0
Furthermore, treating the state goal of eliminating sex discrimination as
forming a reasonable justification for limiting free speech' 0 1 should allow a
cutting back of fundamental freedoms in section 1 in order to reinforce
equality or combat sex inequality.
Just as Chief Justice Dickson commented in Keegstra that "multiculturalism
cannot be preserved let alone enhanced if free rein is given to the promotion
of hatred against identifiable cultural groups,"' 0 2 it could similarly be said
that equality cannot be guaranteed equally to male and female persons if free
rein is given to pornography.
2. Are the Means Chosen to Attain the Objective Reasonably and DemonstrablyJustified
in a Free and Democratic Society? Once the pressing and substantial objective of
the legislation is identified, the second branch of the Oakes test,
proportionality, must be examined. The Court determines whether the
means-the criminal prohibition of obscenity-is proportional and
appropriate to the ends of suppressing pornography in order to maintain
individual dignity and women's equality. The Court must consider not only
the importance of the right in question and the significance of its limitation,
0 3
but also whether the way in which the limitation is imposed is justifiable.1
In a society where gender inequality and sexual violence exist as
entrenched and widespread social problems, 0 4 criminal legislation
prohibiting material that attempts to make degradation, humiliation,
victimization, and violence against women appear normal and acceptable
would be more in line with principles of a free and democratic society than
otherwise. The criminal prohibition should meet the requirement of rational
connection to the legislative objective by fostering non-violent, nonaggressive, positive gender relations in a community dedicated to sex
100. Lahey, 20 New Eng L Rev at 683 (cited in note 26).
101. Id.
102. Keegstra, [19901 3 SCR at 758, citing Andrews and Smith, [1990] 3 SCR at 880 (Cory).
103. The definition of obscenity in § 163(8) of the Criminal Code reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue
exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime,
horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene.
104. Fringe Product, 53 CCC at 444.
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equality; it obviously bears a rational connection to the protection of those
targeted by pornography.
Whether the means used impair freedom of expression as little as possible
will depend on how the Court interprets the key words of the obscenity
definition, "undue exploitation of sex."' 0 5 If they are interpreted to include
mere sexual explicitness according to the morality standard, 10 6 or it will be
difficult to find a rational connection between the legislative objective and the
means chosen to attain it, minimal impairment. Arguably, the net is cast too
wide if mere explicitness amounts to "undue exploitation of sex." The
inherent vagueness in the assessment would probably fail to meet the
requirements of intelligible standards. On the other hand, if the harm-based
equality interpretation is adopted, the rational connection is there. The
impairment to expression is minimized because the harm is more explicit and
the application of the law more predictable.
In this part of the section 1 assessment, the Court will also examine
whether other less intrusive means are available to Parliament to meet their
objective. "The means, even if rationally connected to the objective . . .
should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question." ° 7 In
Irwin Toy, however, the Court softened this requirement, emphasizing the
importance of protecting vulnerable groups where evidence indicates the ban
is reasonable: "This Court will not in the name of minimal impairment, take a
restrictive approach to social science evidence and require legislatures to
08
choose the least ambitious means to protect vulnerable groups."'
The Court also distinguished between situations where the government
mediates conflicts involving different groups with competing interests and
those situations where government is the singular antagonist of the individual
whose right has been infringed. 09 Where the latter is true, the Court will take
a stricter approach to the "least drastic means test." Even though
pornographers cast themselves as victims of government oppression, the
products they produce, distribute, and sell arguably show, them to be
aggressors in a social conflict between women and men. Obscenity laws could
be seen as advancing the interests of women, while pornographers advance
the interests of the dominant male group by subordinating women. If that is
the case, obscenity laws should be viewed as Parliament's reasonable
assessment as to where a line should be drawn between competing interests.
By prohibiting the undue exploitation of sex interpreted as violent,
degrading, and dehumanizing depictions, Parliament strikes a reasonable
105. Criminal Code § 163(8).
106. Historically, obscenity law was justified on the basis of morality, a rationale which has been
the subject of much criticism and obscures pornography's discriminatory effects on women. Some
courts rely on the morality standard,justifying regulation on the "dirt for dirt's sake" rationale. See,
for example, R. v Pereira-Vasquez, 26 BCLR (2d) 273 (1988), 64 CR (3d) 253, 269 (BCCA); R. v Video
IWorld Ltd, [1986] 22 CCC (3d) 331, 342-43; [1986] 1 WWR 413, 36 Man R (2d) 68 (Man CA), leave
denied, [1987] 1 SCR 1255.
107. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR at 139.
108. Irwin Tov, [1989] 1 SCR at 994.
109. Id at 995.
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balance that courts should not second guess. It follows that the relative
burdens of the parties under section 1 should be assessed by requiring
pornographers to justify limiting the equality rights of women, just as the
Crown should have to justify any limit on freedom of expression that
obscenity laws create.
The final portion of the Oakes test requires the Court to examine the
proportionality between the effect of the obscenity laws on freedom of
expression and the legislative objective. If the contextual approach of
Keegstra, Royal College, 10o and Edmonton Journal l are followed, the Court will
examine the relationship of pornography to the free expression values of
seeking and attaining the truth, participation in social and political
decisionmaking, and individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing.
The Butler Court should find that, like hate propaganda, pornography is
low-value speech. It is hardly persuasive to argue that opinions advocating
the sexual torture or degradation of women in pornography will lead to a
better world or can contribute to truth-seeking. Rather than a vehicle for
seeking and attaining the truth, pornography more obviously inhibits truthseeking because it intimidates and silences women, preventing them from
asserting the truth. While it could be said that pornography may be of some
value through educating the population about misogyny, it is far from clear
that an open confrontation with pornography in the marketplace of ideas
leads to a richer belief in the truth; it is more likely that the opposite result
occurs. Debasement of women in pornographic magazines, books, movies,
films, or on television, on street corner news-stands, on covers of record
albums, and in shop windows is an ever-increasing phenomenon. Three
surveys indicate that sales of pornographic magazines in Canada increased by
326.7 percent between 1965 and 1980. This represents an increase of at least
fourteen times the growth of the Canadian population during the same
period."l 2 The messages in pornography that women and children are sex
objects available to be violated, coerced, and subordinated at the will of men
is replicated in real life statistics that are also increasing at a rapid rate.
Widespread sexual assault, wife battery, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse
of children indicate that the competing idea that women as human beings are
equal to men and that children must be treated with dignity and respect is not
emerging from the marketplace in any significant way.'' 3 The "value" of
110. Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 SCR 232.
111. Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326, 1355-56.
112. Report of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths, Sexual Offences
Against Children 180-83 (Minister of Supply and Serv, 1984) (Chair: Robin F. Badgley) ("Badgley
Report").
113. See Lorenne Clark & Debra Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality 61 (Women's Press,
1977) (stating that incidents of rape increased by 174% between 1961 and 1971 in Canada). In the
period 1969-1973, it increased 76%. Susan Armstrong, in Vife
Beating. Let's Stop itNow, Canadian
Living 89 (July 1985) (stating that one women in ten is beaten by her husband or common law
spouse); Badgley Report at 180-83 (cited in note 112) (stating that 50% of women and 30% of men
are victims of unwanted sexual acts or incidents occurring before adulthood). See generally Fraser
Report (cited in note 92).
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pornography as a truth-seeking device in these terms would seem to range
from remote to none. In light of the serious facts detailing widespread abuse,
it does not make sense to suggest that the uninhibited activity of
pornographers is important to maintaining a belief that what they have to say
is wrong. If pornography is seen to subvert the truth-seeking process itself,
the interests of seeking truth work against rather than in favour of it. 114
The harms of pornography render it antithetical to the other values and
purposes underlying the freedom of expression guarantee as well. For
example, it is difficult to imagine that pornography encourages community
participation. The more likely scenario is that social and political
participation of women is constrained by pornography because it undermines
respect for them. In terms of the value of self-fulfilment, if individuals who
traffic in and consume pornography are fulfilled, it is at the expense of the
rights of women. Human flourishing of men cannot be said to be encouraged
by material that harms women.
Pornographers and civil libertarians often argue that the harm of
pornography is "in the eye of the beholder" and any offensiveness caused is
easily diminished or eradicated by averting the eyes or not listening. The
problem with this argument is that the categorization of "offensiveness"
wrongly places the harm within the victim's control. It suggests that if the
victim is harmed it is her own fault because she should or could have avoided
it. This form of victim-blaming ignores the true essence of discrimination,
which is not how members of disadvantaged groups feel about themselves,
but rather how they are viewed by members of the dominant majority.
To the extent that the majority in Keegstra made a clear finding that
degradation and humiliation fall into the category of serious harms rather
than mere offensiveness, it will be difficult for pornographers to argue that
pornography's harms are trivial or within the victims' control. In Keegstra, the
harms caused by hate propaganda were analogized to the harms of sexual
harassment, an individualized harm that also promotes group
disadvantage.115 Pornography's harms, which affect women as a class as well
as individual women, should at the very least be equivalent to the harms
caused by hate propaganda.
When an equality analysis is used to determine what is a reasonable limit
prescribed by law in the context of a free and democratic society, courts allow
the government to alleviate the harmful effects of discrimination. From an
equality perspective, the means chosen by Parliament to alleviate
discrimination through obscenity laws are rationally connected to the
objectives of protecting society and individuals from dehumanization and
degradation. The limitations that the obscenity laws place on expression
minimally impair the freedom because pornography is contrary to the
114. See Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in Amenca 87-93
(Oxford U Press, 1986).
115. In Janzen, [1989] 1 SCR 1252, Justice Dickson drew a clear connection between sexual
harassment and sex inequality generally.
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principles and values that underlie its protection. Any limit on freedom of
expression is slight when compared with the deleterious effect pornography
has on women and on society as a whole. An equality analysis further
recognizes that the legislative action to deter degradation and
dehumanization of women goes some way to redress the imbalance of power
between the sexes.
IV
CONCLUSION

Canadian judges are in the process of challenging existing thought about
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. The assumption that
human behaviour can be generalized into natural universal laws is being
challenged by the analytical approach which favours context rather than
detached objectivity. It rebels against linearity and inevitability. It does not
accept that certain truths exist and that.it is futile to try and change them. By
expanding the perimeters of the discussion, previously hidden underlying
facts and issues are being exposed. As a result, decisions as to which facts are
relevant, how the issues are framed, and which legal principles are binding are
changing. Obscenity and hate propaganda laws are being refrained in
equality terms and defended as such in constitutional litigation. The question
of harm is starting to be addressed in a way that recognizes the experience of
inequality and subordination.
In the United States, on the other hand, the contextual approach has not
been incorporated into first amendment doctrine as it applies to extremist
speech to the extent that it has in Canada. Furthermore, equality, particularly
sex equality, does not appear to carry the same constitutional weight.
Earlier in the article, I discussed the different civil liberties politics in
Canada and the United States. 1 16 Both countries' traditions for civil liberties
grow from the thoughts of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Mill. The tradition
has centered on individualism and the individual's relationship to the state.
The state was to interfere only when one individual violated the rights of
another. The law, as neutral arbiter, was to apply rules equally.
But the commitment to civil liberties, while a good start, is only the
beginning. Human rights start where civil liberties end. Human rights go
beyond the relationship of the individual to the state and emphasize the
relationship of individuals to one another. They invoke the state's
intervention and assistance because individuals in their capacity as members
of groups are disadvantaged for arbitrary reasons. Human rights principles
allow for different treatment because not all individuals have suffered historic,
generic exclusion because of their group membership. Where barriers
impede fairness for some individuals they should be removed, even if this
means treating some people differently. Intellectual pluralism does not and
116.

See text accompanying notes 45-52.
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cannot mean that racism or sexism will be given the same deference as
tolerance.' 17
Where we can make common cause with civil liberties, we should. But
when the debate involves the clash of interests presented by hate propaganda
and pornography, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories that served a
need that modem democracies have outgrown do not seem to be the best way
to solve the problem. No democracy should be embarrassed or
uncomfortable prioritizing the needs of the impoverished, disempowered,
and disadvantaged over those who are more privileged.
Equality is an emerging right. Establishing it requires reciprocity of
respect and parity of regard for physical dignity and personal integrity. Legal
interpretation must be guided by these values and goals if the constitutional
mandate of equality is to be met. Problems of the future cannot always be
solved using the intellectual frameworks of the past. The goal of a more
humane and egalitarian society requires new ways of talking about the
problems of free expression; otherwise we will find the progressive tools of an
earlier era turned against progress. I hope that Canadian and American
judges will continue along the path that has been mapped by a few in deciding
what is and is not obscene, and what limits can be set on the public, wilful
promotion of group hatred based on a context-driven, harm-based equality
analysis. If they do, rights and duties will be allocated equitably, not simply
on the basis of abstract, doctrinally stagnant grand principles of formal
equality that thwart rather than achieve substantive liberty and substantive
equality.
AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPr

On February 27, 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the
obscenity law in Canada using a harms-based equality analysis. It held that the law
infringed freedom of expression as protected by section 2(b) of the Charter, but it
nevertheless passed the section 1 reasonable limit test. Although the Court declined
to accept the argument that some forms of pornography fall outside the Charter's
ambit because they constitute violent forms of expression, the Court focussed on the
harm of violence, degradation, and dehumanization in pornography as the basis for
its decision.
The Court limited its deliberations to an examination of the definition of obscenity
in section 163, which states that obscenity is "the undue exploitation of sex or of sex
and one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and
violence."' 18 The Court said that the meaning of "undue" must be determined by a

"community standard of tolerance." This determination must be made on the basis
of the degree of harm that may flow from such exposure, harm of the type which
predisposes persons to act in an anti-social manner. In explicitly finding pornography
to be harmful, the Court said it harms women's rights to be equal, their sense of selfworth, and their physical safety. The harm is exacerbated, the Court said, by the
117. Rosalie Abella, Keynote Address, National Symposium on Women, Law, and the
Administration of Justice (June 10, 1991) (paper available from the Department ofJustice, Canada).
118. See note 86.
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burgeoning pornography industry, making the objective of Parliament more pressing
and substantial now than when section 163 was first enacted.
The type of sexual material at which the statute aims, the Court said, is the
portrayal of sex coupled with violence or explicit sex which is degrading or
dehumanizing and which creates a substantial risk of harm. Explicit sex which is
neither violent, degrading, nor dehumanizing will not be considered obscene unless it
involves the use of children in its production. The Court recognizes an exception to
the law where the obscene depiction is necessary for artistic purposes or for the
serious treatment of a theme.
In the section 1 analysis, the Court clarified the purpose of the obscenity
provisions. It said that Parliament's objective is not moral disapprobation but rather,
avoidance of harm of the type that potentially victimizes women. This classification in
the law is historic. For the first time, the Supreme Court of Canada has linked the
obscene with that which subordinates or degrades women rather than that which
offends some notion of sexual morality.
Once the Court found that the purpose of the legislation was the avoidance of
harm, it had little difficulty in upholding the law on the basis of the Oakes 119 criteria.
For example, Justice Sopinka, writing for the Court, said that the harms analysis
makes it untenable to argue that time, place, and manner restrictions are a better
form of regulation than prohibition. This reasoning is correct because imposing
heavy taxes on pornography, or requiring special licenses for its distribution sends
the message that harms to women will be tolerated as long as the user pays.
Government would be complicit in the pornography trade and even become a
participant in it if it collected taxes or issued licenses. Justice Sopinka pointed out
how inconsistent and hypocritical it is to argue time, place, and manner restrictions
once the state has reasonably concluded that certain acts are harmful to certain
groups in society. To permit such acts as long as conditions are more restrictive is
20
wrong because the harm sought to be avoided remains the same in either case.i
This approach is encouraging because it means that the Charter is not neutral on
practices that promote inequality. Rather, it is a constitutional commitment to ending
them.
The suggestion that reactive solutions such as the provision of counselling for
rape victims are more proportional to the objective than prohibition also lose their
force once harms are recognized. As alternatives to prohibition, they imply that
women must absorb the harm caused by the very behaviour encouraged by
pornography. It is hard to believe that such a requirement could have any credibility
in any society that is free and democratic and has equality as an entrenched
guarantee. Certainly these and other strategies should be offered to protect women
from violent men, but to argue, as the civil liberties intervenors in the Butler case did,
that they are preferable to controlling the dissemination of the very images that
contribute to such behaviours diminishes the harm and consequently diminishes
women and children as full citizens. As the Court stressed, serious social problems
2
such as violence against women and children requires a multi-faceted approach.i i
In examining the freedom of expression values of pursuit and attainment of the
truth, participation in the political process, and individual self-fulfillment, the Court
119.
120.
121.

See text accompanying note 36.
R. v Butler, [1992] SCC at 62 (Feb 27, 1992) (unreported).
Idat61.
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found, as it did in Keegstra, that speech which harms people is low-value speech. The
Court said the kind of expression represented by pornography does not stand on
equal footing with other kinds of expression values.' 2 2 The Court buttressed this
view by taking judicial notice of the fact that pornography is motivated, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, by economic profit. In summary, the Court's
recognition that the sexual exploitation of women and children can lead to "abject
and servile victimization" as well as other types of harm goes some way toward
redistributing speech rights between men and women. The Court's contextually
sensitive method of defining pornography is responsive to progress in the knowledge
and understanding of pornography and its harms. The Butler decision is a welcome
development in the law that other countries and the international human rights
community should contemplate if they are genuinely serious about women's human
rights, violence against women, and women's equality.

122.

Idat 51.

